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Abstract: The aim of the article is to analyze the role of the European Council in 
negotiations related to the planned withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the Eu-
ropean Union. European Union law defines the key role of the European Council in 
these negotiations. It is this institution that is responsible for shaping the principles 
and guidelines on the basis of which the negotiations are being conducted. It is no less 
important to regulate the future relations of the UK with the EU after the British leave 
the European Union. The role of the European Council will be crucial there as well.
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Introduction
The process of European integration was dialectical from its very be-ginning, because opposing processes clashed with each other. On the 
one hand, the idea of deepening the European integration process, and 
thus in practice bringing its federalization, on the other hand the tenden-
cies and processes which were perceived as the member states’ liberation 
from the authority of supranational institutions (Faber, 2006,  pp. 1–4). 
Of course, individual countries have differed and still differ in terms of 
assessment and support for these processes. On the one hand, the Benelux 
states almost always support pro-federal solutions. On the other hand, the 
northern states are skeptical about engagement beyond the framework of 
purely intergovernmental cooperation.
1 The article was written as part of a project sponsored by the National Science 
Centre: “The European Council in the process of forming formal and informal com-
petences in the realm of the European Union’s external activities,” no. 2015/19/B/
HS5/00131.
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Within this second category of processes, the establishment by mem-
ber states at the turn of the 1960s and 1970s of the European Council as 
an institution which was to enable member states take control over the 
European integration’s process should be analyzed (Schoutheete, 2006, 
pp. 39–47). Thanks to the decisions made by the European Council in 
recent decades, there has been significant progress in European integra-
tion, but with greater scrutiny by the members over the development of 
the European Communities and the EU.
The foundation of the European Council occurred at the same time as 
the accession of the United Kingdom to the EC, which after many pertur-
bations finally took place in 1973. From the very beginning of relations 
with the Communities, and even before their creation in the 1950s, the 
United Kingdom looked with great suspicion at the legal structures used 
to manage these international organizations, based on the considerable 
decision-making autonomy of those institutions independent from mem-
ber states. Throughout the entire membership period, the United Kingdom 
practically contested all activities aimed at increasing the supranational 
institutions’ powers, as well as steps taken to expand integration outside 
the area of economic cooperation within the internal market borders.
The victory of the British Conservative Party in the parliamentary 
elections in 2010 heralded the intensification of anti-EU rhetoric intro-
duced by the new government formed by David Cameron (The Guard-
ian, 2015). The earlier, much more pro-European, though still cautious, 
policy of the Labour Party was criticized by the most Euroskeptic Tory 
representatives for many years. The new Prime Minister had to make an 
effort to ensure political stability within his own party and ensure another 
victory in the forthcoming election. One of the key instruments used for 
reaching those aims turned out to be anti-EU rhetoric, which won over 
voters and limited criticism from the PM’s own party. However, the main 
idea around which Cameron built his position in the internal politics was 
to hold a referendum on the further membership of the United Kingdom 
of the European Union.
Eventually, the British voted on the issue of their further member-
ship of the EU during the second term of Conservative government. In 
June 2016, the majority of voters supported withdrawal from the EU (The 
Guardian 2016b). David Cameron, with reference to the previously ne-
gotiated “special relations,” encouraged his citizens to vote on staying 
in the EU. However, a much earlier campaign aimed at strengthening the 
already strong British Euroskepticism, won. This led to the resignation of 
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Cameron as the Prime Minister and the appointment of a new leader who 
took on the challenge of leading the UK’s withdrawal from the EU (The 
Guardian 2016a).
However, from the very beginning, Prime Minister Theresa May has 
had a difficult situation in her own party, because her leadership has been 
strongly contested (Maurice, 2017b). Partly as a consequence of this 
struggle, she made a very serious mistake of calling an early election in 
order to increase her legitimacy. However, this decision led to the loss of 
an independent majority in the House of Commons and the necessity of 
dealing with Unionists from Northern Ireland (Politico 2017).
The purpose of this article is to analyze what role the European Coun-
cil currently plays in the negotiations on the issue of British exit from the 
European Union, and also to analyze how the new foreign policy of the 
European Union is being shaped in relation to the United Kingdom. The 
research hypothesis examined in this article assumes that the European 
Council, by imposing a negotiating model, affects the reaction and weak-
ens the UK’s negotiating position during negotiations on the withdrawal 
of that country from the European Union, at the same time affecting the 
difficult, future mutual relations.
Brexit negotiations and the political role of the European Council
Analyzing the role of the European Council in Brexit, it is necessary 
to go back to the beginning of 2016, when the former British Prime Min-
ister, David Cameron tried to negotiate some deviations for the United 
Kingdom from the basic principles of the functioning of the European 
Union, which, with a positive outcome of these negotiations, were to 
form the basis for recommending its citizens to vote to stay in the Euro-
pean Union (The European Council, 2016,  pp. 8–24). Those negotiations 
were a problem from the perspective of the member states, because on 
the one hand they wanted to keep the United Kingdom in the European 
Union, which is particularly important during a period of political, eco-
nomic or migratory crises within the EU. On the other hand, the members 
of the Union had to ensure the coherence of European Union law, in the 
sense of compliance of the adopted regulations with the treaties and the 
principle of equality of all member states. It was necessary to maintain 
a delicate balance between concessions for the United Kingdom, and its 
obligations, because there was a fear that other member states may want 
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to follow the UK’s path and negotiate special relations for themselves 
while still being members of the European Union. This situation would 
endanger the stability of the legal and political order of the entire Euro-
pean Union.
It is worth analyzing the nature of specific solutions prepared for keep-
ing the United Kingdom in the EU, and their importance for creating fur-
ther elements of diversified integration in the EU. First of all, the UK was 
exempt from having to take part in any further activities in the field of po-
litical integration. The exclusion also included not applying to the United 
Kingdom the idea enshrined in the preamble of the treaties, namely the 
necessity to build “an ever closer Union among the nations of Europe.” 
Secondly, an introduction of solutions at the level of secondary legislation 
enabling temporary application of restrictions under the free movement 
of workers, “in situations of extremely high inflow of workers from other 
Member States in the longer term” was announced, which would establish 
general clauses with very imprecise application conditions. Thirdly, there 
were previews of the introduction of transitional measures in the new 
accession treaties in the field of free movement of people which would 
restrict the possibility of newly admitted EU citizens to use the existing 
rules (The European Council, 2016,  pp. 8–24).
The negotiated solutions allowed the British Prime Minister to recom-
mend to his citizens a vote for staying in the European Union. Despite 
the support from David Cameron’s government for remaining in the Eu-
ropean Union on the basis of the package of negotiated reforms, which in 
his opinion significantly strengthened the position of the United Kingdom 
in the European Union (H. Stewart, R. Syal, R. Mason, 2016), and the 
additional targeted action of the European Union on the implementation 
of British interests, these issues did not exist in practice during the pre-
referendum campaign in June 2016. Nevertheless, reality showed that the 
citizens still voted by a small majority for leaving the European Union, 
which resulted in David Cameron’s resignation.
So, as already noted, even before the formal notification of the UK’s 
desire to leave the EU, the European Council was involved in potentially 
preventing the danger of Brexit. However, the final result of these activi-
ties turned out to be negative. Therefore, the question should be asked of 
whether the member states, and thus the European Council as an institu-
tion, could actually have done more for a positive result of the Brexit 
referendum in the United Kingdom, which should be understood as con-
senting to greater concessions to that country. It seems that, in fact, the 
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outcome of these negotiations and the position taken by the British Prime 
Minister after their completion had practically no influence on the British 
decision taken in the referendum. Only a handful of voters would have 
likely been guided by the opinion of the Prime Minister, but it was of little 
importance to the overall result.
It should be noted that the British Prime Minister’s much earlier poli-
cy of conducting internal policy through anti-EU rhetoric led to the effect 
that the majority of Britons felt that it would be better for their country to 
leave the European Union. Thus, it turned out that the negotiations were 
pointless because, by his earlier risky game David Cameron convinced 
the British that the European Union was a project which was not worth 
participating in (Rettman 2013).
Article 50 of the European Union Treaty indicates only the basic prin-
ciples relating to the course of negotiations on the withdrawal of a state 
from the European Union. Because in practice, apart from the case of 
Greenland, this is the first time that a member state has attempted to leave 
the European Union, so a model of negotiations will be created during 
their conduct. A certain model for Brexit could be sought in the model 
of negotiations for membership of the European Union. However, this 
breakthrough event forced the necessity of building, on the one hand, 
a model in which negotiations will take place in a formal sense, and on the 
other hand also shaping the negotiating position of the European Union 
as a whole, which is a basic difficulty because of the competitive interests 
of EU member states.
The very similar negotiation mechanism, familiar from accession ne-
gotiations, is something that means the British government is in a more 
difficult situation with regard to the European Union. It is worth noting 
that, on the one hand negotiations are conducted on a working level by 
Michel Barnier, and on the other hand we have talks at the highest political 
level with the European Council. It is the European Council that assesses 
the progress of negotiations, and thus in fact, the acting and willingness 
of the British government to cooperation with the EU, so the European 
Council will decide whether to initiate or not negotiations referring to 
future relations. So the British side is subjected to pressure from two ac-
tors acting in the interests of the EU: EU negotiators in daily negotiations; 
and the European Council, which only from time to time speaks about the 
progress of negotiations. That is why the British sometimes could have an 
illusory conviction about the progress of negotiations in analyzing issues 
resolved during particular negotiation sessions and, on the other hand, 
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there would be a message from the European Council about insufficient 
progress of these negotiations, which, as indicated earlier, blocks the pos-
sibility of talks on those issues most significant to the British.
The basis for the negotiations are the guidelines adopted by the European 
Council in April 2017. On an operational level, however, the Council of the 
European Union prepared “Directives for the negotiation of an agreement 
with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland setting out 
the arrangements for its withdrawal from the European Union” which es-
tablished precise technical details for the conducted negotiations, but more 
importantly, expanded and refined the EU’s negotiating goals (The Council, 
2017a, pp. 1–16; The Council 2017b, pp. 1–4). There is a two-phase ap-
proach indicated by the European Council. The first phase will concentrate 
on securing the rights of EU citizens and businesses in the United King-
dom after this state leaving the EU. The second crucial problem during 
this phase will be to “[s]ettle the disentanglement of the United Kingdom 
from the Union and from all the rights and obligations the United Kingdom 
derives from commitments undertaken as a Member State” (The European 
Council, 2017, p. 4). The second part of the negotiations will concern future 
EU-UK relations. The very formation of the negotiating process puts the 
UK in a difficult position, and undoubtedly the European Council intention-
ally divided the two phases of the negotiations. The conflicting interests of 
the United Kingdom and the EU are obvious, and concern the gradation of 
the goals of both negotiating partners. Focusing on the technical aspects of 
negotiations, the Union negotiator is supposed to conduct negotiations with 
the United Kingdom in “continuous coordination and permanent” coopera-
tion with the Council and its preparatory bodies, especially Coreper (The 
Council, 2017a, pp. 1–16). This engagement of member states allows them 
to control every step and decision made by Michel Barnier. Of course, by 
appointing Barnier the European Commission wanted to take the fore on 
the EU side to implement and preserve its own interests. Possible disputes 
between European Commission member states will not necessarily lead to 
the strengthening of British negotiators’ position. Rather, negotiations will 
be slowed down, because in the event of disagreement between the institu-
tions of the EU, the European Council will ultimately decide whether or not 
to approve the results of negotiations. Therefore, any attempts to make the 
European Commission autonomous during the negotiations will meet with 
a strong reaction from member states.
However, first of all, it is worth focusing on a certain key mechanism 
that the European Council in practice imposed on the United Kingdom. 
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Namely, the current Theresa May government was placed in the role of 
a petitioner in ongoing talks, expecting to present positions on individ-
ual sensitive issues relating to future bilateral relations. It turned out in 
practice that the European Union is unilaterally shaping the course of the 
negotiation process, because it imposes on the British government the ob-
ligation to present proposals solving the most sensitive issues, and then in 
most cases the EU negates the British propositions, expecting new, more 
favorable ones from the EU’s perspective. But even more importantly, the 
progress in these issues identified as key for the EU is related to the poten-
tial consent of the European Council to start negotiations on a future trade 
agreement which will be the basis for the new relations with the United 
Kingdom. However, from a British perspective, this is a crucial issue in 
the ongoing negotiations, perhaps even more important than the issues of 
the “divorce” with the EU. Now this process is completely blocked by the 
European Council.
There are several key issues from the perspective of the European 
Council which determine the course of the negotiation process with the 
United Kingdom. First of all, there is the problem related to the future 
statuses of current nationals of member states living in the United King-
dom. The crucial issues are the solutions related to acquired rights which 
the British government will propose after Brexit for those EU nationals 
who want to remain in the United Kingdom. It is, however, obvious that 
the European Union would like these rights to be fully maintained. Last 
but not least, the EC would like to control the United Kingdom’s compli-
ance with these obligations using the European Court of Justice, so this 
EU court will determine whether the rights of EU citizens are being fully 
respected in accordance with the provisions of the agreement concluded 
with the European Union (Rettman, 2017). From the British perspective, 
however, this is a fundamental problem, because in the election campaign 
the problem of immigrants, especially those from Central European coun-
tries, was one of the leading themes of the camp supporting withdrawal 
from the European Union, and this political statement received wide-
spread support from a large part of the British population. Thus, the Brit-
ish government is in a very difficult situation, because on the one hand it 
has to meet the expectations of European Union member states regarding 
the status of their citizens after Brexit, and on the other hand it has to ful-
fill the obligation imposed on it by its citizens in a political sense.
The announcement of the surprise early election made by Theresa 
May indicated that, even among those who rule the United Kingdom, 
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there is a significant lack of conviction as to the rules and guidelines for 
conducting the Brexit negotiations with the EU ( Zalan, 2017). The argu-
ment used by Theresa May that her decision was aimed at obtaining a sta-
ble majority supporting the withdrawal from the EU (Maurice, 2017a) is 
difficult to consider credible, because the decision of the British Prime 
Minister ended up with the opposite situation, and thus strengthened the 
Bremainers’ camp.
Another issue that could potentially appear on the agenda in connec-
tion with the negotiations is the problem of the lack of agreement on the 
notification by the UK government of its desire to leave the European 
Union within two years. In this case, there are two potential solutions 
in accordance with Art. 50 of the European Union Treaty. Namely, in 
the first case, the European Council may decide to extend negotiations 
in accordance with the United Kingdom. The second solution is simply 
the recognition that after two years from the notification of the desire to 
leave the EU, the United Kingdom ceases to be a member of the European 
Union (Consolidated).
At this stage, it is difficult to say whether the negotiations will be 
finalized on time, however, the relatively small progress on key issues, 
and additionally the need to ratify the negotiated agreement, indicate 
that the deadline may not be met. At this point, on the margins of the 
main argument, it is worth solving one of the issues related to the con-
clusion of an agreement on the withdrawal of a member state from the 
European Union. Namely, such an agreement on the part of the Europe-
an Union does not require ratification by member states (Consolidated). 
The situation is different in the case of EU enlargement, when such con-
sent is required, which automatically affects the extension and potential 
uncertainty of the ratification process. However, the question whether 
this agreement will actually require ratification will be resolved only 
after it has been negotiated, as it may turn out that due to its content it 
will regulate issues that lie within the competences of the member states 
and their national parliaments, and thus ratification will be required by 
all 27 member states.
A situation can be imagined in which the content concerning with-
drawal and issues concerning future EU-UK relations will be placed in 
two separate agreements. Nevertheless, from the British perspective, the 
latter agreement is much more important, and it is difficult to imagine that 
this document would only deal with trade issues, which would then make 
its ratification by European Union institutions alone possible. Due to the 
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planned transition periods, the issue of EU citizens’ rights, or the UK’s 
financial commitment after Brexit, it seems that there will be very strong 
pressure from national parliaments to ratify the agreement regulating the 
new relationship in a parliamentary manner.
So, if the situation arose where after two years there was a need to 
extend negotiations, the question that has to be asked concerns the condi-
tions under which the European Council would make such a decision. Of 
course, it seems that it would be in the interest of both parties to extend 
these negotiations until full agreement is reached. At the same time, how-
ever, the lack of such a solution would be a much bigger problem for the 
United Kingdom than the European Union. One can refer primarily to the 
uncertainty of British business as to future relations with the EU, which 
results in, for example, the announcements of the possible relocation of 
enterprises from the UK to the area of the internal market. Therefore, 
once again, the role of the European Council could turn out to be crucial 
in creating relations with the UK, as it would be an opportunity to force 
the negotiating partner to agree to solutions that it previously opposed as 
a condition for conducting further negotiations. Due to the significant dy-
namics of negotiations, it is difficult at present to determine what specific 
issues could be the subject of such concessions.
A “new” foreign policy. How the EU will manage post-Brexit 
relations with the United Kingdom
The case of the United Kingdom, which was the first state to initiate 
the procedure of leaving the European Union, is a completely new situa-
tion. Thus, in relation to the United Kingdom, there is an unprecedented 
situation where, still being a member of the EU, it participates in making 
key decisions for the European Union. However, at the same time, the 
United Kingdom does not take part in discussions shaping the position 
of the European Union in Brexit negotiations. As a result, we are deal-
ing with a situation when there is a need to shape a “new” foreign policy 
in the geographical sense, because the state that will most likely leave 
the European Union will appear as a “new foreign country.” This is why 
the European Union must build its relations with the United Kingdom 
at this stage as a non-EU member state, but as a country with which the 
European Union undoubtedly has to cooperate, due to various conditions, 
mainly geographic, historical and economic.
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After the referendum, and the confirmation by the British authorities 
of respecting its citizens’ decision to start negotiations on withdrawing 
from the European Union, statements of politicians from other member 
states have appeared which indicate that Britain cannot, in any case, count 
on retaining the solutions that are most beneficial for the UK, namely 
those relating to their participation in the internal market, at the same time 
resigning from less welcome obligations. Very clearly, German Chancel-
lor Angela Merkel said that the negotiation process cannot be based on 
the British “choosing candies” (The Guardian, 2017). However, what has 
not been clearly said, but could undoubtedly appear, is the conviction of 
many European politicians about the necessity of punishing the British 
during the negotiation process so that no other member states would try 
to copy the British political path and leave the European Union, while on 
the other hand continuing to enjoy the benefits of European integration. 
Therefore, the negotiations, apart from the need to establish rules con-
cerning Brexit, also have a second, symbolic dimension, aimed at increas-
ing the cohesion and commitment of other member states in the process 
of European integration.
Undoubtedly, the situation in which EU member states shape a com-
mon interest in opposition to the British interest in the negotiations on 
British withdrawal from the European Union is a situation that reduces 
confidence in relations between the UK and individual member states. It 
has to be taken into account that the UK is still a member of the EU and, 
as stated above, both sides are condemned to cooperate in the future. So 
punishments made during this phase of negations may influence difficul-
ties in the unfolding history of EU-UK relations.
The crucial statement concerning the “new” foreign policy is included 
in political guidelines set by the European Council on April 29, 2017. As 
the EC stated: “The European Council welcomes and shares the United 
Kingdom’s desire to establish a close partnership between the Union and 
the United Kingdom after its departure. While a relationship between the 
Union and a non-Member State cannot offer the same benefits as Union 
membership, strong and constructive ties will remain in both sides’ inter-
est and should encompass more than just trade” (The European Council, 
2017, p. 8). First of all, what is obvious is the distinction between the 
situation of a member state and non-member states. Secondly, the Euro-
pean Council recognizes the need for cooperation in areas beyond trade 
exchange. However, it further indicates that cooperation in the scope of 
the free trade area must be balanced. Cooperation will be necessary in the 
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area of, for example, internal security and global problems. On the other 
hand, it can undoubtedly be said that the European Union will strive to re-
strict UK access to the internal market, that is, to the remaining freedoms 
of movement. The British government, despite less than friendly actions 
on the part of the EU, will be focused on a pragmatic model of negoti-
ating future relations, because Theresa May is aware that the future of 
the British economy will largely depend on the quality of the negotiated 
agreement. At the same time, however, there are also signs from EU insti-
tutions that the British will be able to “buy” wider access to the internal 
market (Fox, 2017). Therefore, ultimately, everything may break down 
over the “price” of such a transaction. When it comes to Brexit, eventu-
ally, one can assume that the relations between the EU and the UK will 
initially be strained due to the new situation for both partners, as well 
as the memory of the manner and effects of negotiations. On both sides 
there may be a kind of regret associated with the difficult negotiations. 
Ultimately, however, a conciliatory approach must be won, because only 
this will enable effective cooperation in the future.
Conclusions
The European Council is a key element of the negotiation system re-
lated to the UK’s withdrawal from the EU. The European Council pre-
pared guidelines that determine the scope and pace of negotiations. These 
are guidelines that first take into account the interest of the European 
Union and its member states. The British government in practice had to 
agree on the model of negotiations shaped by the European Union.
The difficult internal situation in British policy further weakens the 
negotiating position of Prime Minister Theresa May. On the one hand, it 
is criticized by Brexit activists that negotiations are too slow and, above 
all, that the UK government is making too many concessions to the EU. 
On the other hand, a minority government along with ministers who un-
dermine the authority of Theresa May and who dreams of taking her place 
(Maurice, 2017b), does not help Prime Minister to enhance her position 
towards Brussels. So at the end those very complex negotiations are an 
easy pretext to criticize Theresa May’s leadership.
The EU undoubtedly has an advantage at this stage of negotiations, 
primarily by blocking the transition to the second stage, where future re-
lations with the UK would be the subject of talks. In fact, despite the con-
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stant pressure from the British government on the EU to agree to start the 
second stage, in practice it may turn out that negotiations on new relations 
will not be simpler than talks on the withdrawal from the EU itself.
The European Council, which is formally responsible for creating the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy, will also have a leading role in 
shaping the political and economic relations with the United Kingdom. 
The European Council will have a rather difficult task, because, as indi-
cated above, it must “punish” the United Kingdom for leaving the EU. At 
the same time, however, it must avoid humiliating its partner, so that it 
can build a future relationship in a positive atmosphere.
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Rola Rady Europejskiej w negocjacjach dotyczących brexitu i kształtowa-
niu „nowej” polityki zagranicznej Unii Europejskiej 
 
Streszczenie
Celem artykułu jest analiza roli Rady Europejskiej w negocjacjach związanych 
z planowanym wystąpieniem Wielkiej Brytanii z Unii Europejskiej. Prawo Unii okre-
śla kluczową rolę Rady Europejskiej w tych negocjacjach. To ta instytucja jest odpo-
wiedzialna za kształtowanie zasad i wytycznych, na podstawie których prowadzone 
są negocjacje. Nie mniej ważne jest uregulowanie przyszłych stosunków Wielkiej 
Brytanii z UE po tym, jak Brytyjczycy opuszczą Unię Europejską, gdzie Rada Euro-
pejska będzie również odgrywać kluczową rolę.
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